Author(s): Sounak Das, Sowmya M A

Abstract: Lewis Carroll's The Hunting of the Snark has long been read as playful nonsense or cryptic allegory, but such approaches overlook the poem's most unsettling feature: meaning persists even when reference becomes impossible. This paper argues that the Snark functions as a non-referring sign. It is a signifier that generates belief, authority, and coordinated social action whilst systematically foreclosing any stable referential ground. Drawing on close textual analysis and Wittgensteinian concepts of language-games and rule-following, the essay demonstrates that meaning in the poem does not collapse through semantic chaos or lexical excess. Instead, it unravels precisely through the successful execution of a fully public, rule-governed linguistic practice. The hunting party follows procedures, heeds warnings, and maintains collective confidence without ever establishing what the Snark actually is. The Bellman's authority rests not upon knowledge but on procedural maintenance. When the Baker finally encounters the creature, the moment of supposed confirmation becomes one of disappearance: 'For the Snark was a Boojum, you see.' This semantic catastrophe exposes a profound fragility in linguistic certainty. Carroll's poem reveals that language can remain operationally coherent and socially binding even when it lacks any survivable referential anchor. Far from mere whimsy, The Hunting of the Snark emerges as a radical literary experiment in meaning without reference, dramatising the unsettling possibility that we may speak meaningfully together about something that cannot survive being found.

Keywords: language-games, nonsense literature, reference, rule-following, semantics, Wittgenstein

Article Info: Received: 07 May 2026; Received in revised form: 03 Jun 2026; Accepted: 07 Jun 2026; Available online: 11 Jun 2026

DOI: 10.22161/ijels.113.60