Author(s): Huo Yidan

Abstract: The power of China's procuratorates to investigate and verify in civil enforcement is established at the normative level, yet its operation is constrained by path dependence on trial-supervision paradigms and the coercive, fast-moving character of enforcement. Rigid initiation thresholds, the absence of coercive deterrents, court–procuratorate data silos, and weak binding force of supervisory outputs impair both procedural and substantive fairness. Grounded in the doctrinal separation of adjudication and enforcement, this article diagnoses these dilemmas and proposes four interlocking reforms: concurrent ex-officio oversight, tiered limited coercive safeguards backed by judicial disciplinary referrals, real-time digital integration across agencies, and a closed-loop accountability regime for procuratorial recommendations. This reconstruction turns enforcement oversight into substantive check-and-balance and offers theoretical reference for the forthcoming Civil Compulsory Enforcement Law.

Keywords: Civil Enforcement, Power of Investigation and Verification, Procuratorial Supervision, Digital Procuratorate, Judicial Compulsory Measures, Legal Dogmatics

Article Info: Received: 26 Sep 2026; Received in revised form: 21 Oct 2026; Accepted: 25 Oct 2026; Available online: 31Oct 2026

DOI: 10.22161/ijels.115.68